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I. Introduction
A. WHAT IS THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT
PARTNERSHIP?
In the summer of 2013, the United States (U.S.) and the European Union
(EU) began negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) between the
two economies.' If signed into law and ratified by all parties, the TTIP
would impact numerous American and European industries (including their
pharmaceutical, agricultural, and financial industries, to name a few) in
potentially far-reaching and important ways. 2 But in order to become law,
the TTIP parties will first have to overcome several practical challenges and
barriers to trade. While advocates for the finalization and implementation
of the TTIP contend that there are many benefits to its completion, the
proposed trade agreement is not without criticism and controversy.3 Many
of these trade barriers and criticisms revolve around differences in the
parties' agricultural sectors. This article examines the current state of
agricultural trade between the U.S. and the EU, barriers faced in current
TTIP negotiations, and the potential implications of a ratified TTIP on the
parties' respective agricultural sectors.
The TTIP aims to make the markets on both sides of the Atlantic more
accessible to each other by removing several barriers that limit trade
between the two parties.4 Current trade barriers include differences in tariff
rates and also non-tariff measures (NTMs) that often involve regulatory
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1. TTIP: What is at Stake for EU Agriculture?, FARM EUROPE (June 9, 2015), http://
www.farm-europe.eu/travaux/ttip-what-is-at-stake-for-eu-agriculture/.
2. Leala Padmanabhan, TTIP: The EU-US Trade Deal Explained, BBC (Dec. 18, 2014), http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30493297.
3. TTIP: What is at Stake for EU Agriculture?, supra note 1.
4. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES; POLICY DEPARTMENT B: STRUCTURAL
AND COHESION POLICIES, 11 (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/
2014/514007/AGRIIPOLSTU%282014%29514007_EN.pdf.
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differences.5 For instance, many products are made more expensive than
necessary because they must undergo double testing from both the U.S. and
the EU, thereby increasing costs and slowing the process of trade.6 Thus,
standardizing certain regulations between the two parties to the agreement
would create less need for double testing, which would speed up the trade
process and make it cheaper, resulting in an increased amount of overall
products traded. This is easier said than done, however, as the differences in
the parties' agricultural regulations are at times vast.
B. THE CURRENT STATE OF TTIP NEGOTIATIONS
As previously mentioned, the initial TTIP negotiations between the U.S.
and the EU took place in the summer of 2013.7 To become law, the EU will
have to present the deal to the European Council and the European
Parliament, both of which must agree to the terms of the deal.S The trade
agreement will also require separate ratification from all twenty-seven
remaining member states of the EU, as well as U.S. Congress.9 Many
negotiating rounds have taken place since the summer of 2013, with the
fourteenth round having concluded on July 15th, 2016.10 However, the last
few negotiating rounds have had lengthy interim periods, suggesting stalled
negotiations and a lack of progress." The deal had an original deadline of
December 2015 for a draft text, which passed due to delays in the
negotiations.12 The EU's chief negotiator, Garcia Bercero, cited the 2016
U.S. Presidential election cycle as a primary reason as to why the
"conclusion of the agreement . . . [required] more time than 2015," as the





8. Padmanabhan, supra note 2.
9. There were twenty-eight members of the EU, but the UK recently left the EU following a
people's referendum. Id.; Jennifer Rankin, Jon Henley, Philip Oltermann and Helena Smith,
EU leaders call for UK to leave as soon as possible, The Guardian (June 24, 2016), http://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/europe-plunged-crisis-britain-votes-leave-eu-european-
union.
10. Conclusion of the 14th TTIP Negotation Round 15 July 2016: Statement by Ignacio Garcia
Bercero EU Chief Negotiator for TTIP, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (July 15, 2016), http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/july/tradocI 54811 .pdf.
11. The thirteenth round of negotiations took place in April of 2016, and the twelfth round
was in February. Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership: (New York, 25-29 April 2016), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 24, 2016), http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/may/tradoc 154581 .pdf; The Twelfth Round of Negotiations
for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTP): Public Report - March 2016,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Mar. 23, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/
tradoc_154391.pdf; Patrick Wintour, US seeking bilateral trade deal with UK to press EUon TTIP,
THE GUARDIAN (uly 20, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/20/us-seeking
-bilateral-trade-deal-with-uk-to-press-eu-on-ttip.
12. Id.
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busy election cycle has hindered U.S. lawmakers' abilities to focus on the
deal.o Tim Bennett, director general and chief executive officer of the
Transatlantic Business Council, has said that finalizing TTIP negotiations by
the end of 2016 is possible.' TTIP advocates favor finishing the deal by the
end of 2016, as negotiations are unlikely to pick back up quickly following
the 2016 and 2017 elections being held in the U.S., France, and Germany.15
TTIP faces particularly strong opposition in the EU states of France and
Germany, and certain U.S. Presidential candidates have voiced strong
opposition to the United States' past and pending trade deals.16 This
growing anti-trade sentiment from politicians and the general public alike
runs directly counter to traditional U.S. trade positions. Thus, depending
on the outcome of the U.S., German, and French elections, it could be very
difficult to effectively continue TTIP negotiations if they are not concluded
by the end of 2016.
C. AGRICULTURAL EFFECTS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT
In 1994, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico entered into an FTA named the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).17 In the agricultural
sector, NAFTA removed tariffs on goods, but did not remove subsidies.'s
These tariff removals had the biggest effect on Mexican agricultural farmers,
who suffered a 19 percent drop in employment.19 From 1991 to 2007, two
million Mexican farmers lost their jobs.20 This was mostly due to the higher
average productivity levels in the U.S. agricultural sector coupled with large
subsidies for U.S. production.21 While NAFITA proponents knew that
Mexican farmers would not be able to compete, they predicted that displaced
Mexican farmers would gain new employment in higher productivity
agricultural and industrial jobs.22 But this did not occur, and instead resulted
13. Id.
14. The Transatlantic Business Council is a "cross-sectoral business association representing
global companies headquartered in the U.S. and EU." History and Mission, TRANs-ATLANTIC
BUSINESS COUNCIL, http://www.transatlanticbusiness.org/about-us/history-mission/; Rosella
Brevetti, U.S., EU look to Conclude TTIP talks in 2016, BLOOMBERG BNA Jan. 8, 2016), http://
www.bna.com/us-eu-look-n57982065951/.
15. Id.
16. Full transcript: Donald Trump's jobs plan speech, POLITICO (June 28, 2016), http://
www.politico.com/story/2016/06/full-transcript-trump-job-plan-speech-224891; Wintour,
supra note 11.
17. Mark Weisbrot, Stephan Lefebvre, & Joseph Sammut, Did NAFTA Help Mexico? An
Assessment After 20 Years, CENTER FOR ECONomic AND POLICY RESEARCH, 4 (Feb. 2014),
http://www.cepr.net/documents/nafta-20-years-2014-02.pdf.
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in a mass emigration of Mexican farmers to the U.S.23 Despite these
negative consequences for Mexican farmers, NAITA's implementation has
ultimately resulted in increased agricultural trade between the three
countries, as the elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers has enabled
both producers and consumers to appropriately respond to changing
economic conditions.24
D. THE STATE OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
EU, AND CHALLENGES FACING THE TTIP NEGOTIATIONS
In 2012, the EU had a surplus of about six billion euros in agricultural
trade with the U.S., in stark contrast to an overall deficit in agricultural trade
with the U.S. in the 1990s.25 Only 8 percent of the EU's agricultural
imports originated from the U.S. in 2012, compared to 21 percent in 1992.26
This drastic change in trading behavior between the two economies came as
a result of the new, large trading partners for both the U.S. and the EU, not
from altered trade policies.27
In 2010, U.S. tariffs on imported EU agricultural goods averaged at 6.6
percent, compared to an overall 2.2 percent tariff average. 28 EU tariffs on
imported U.S. agricultural goods averaged at 12.8 percent, compared to an
overall 3.3 percent tariff average. 29 When the agricultural tariffs for both
parties are so much higher than the overall tariff averages between them, this
demonstrates a tariff barrier to trade in the U.S. and EU agricultural sectors.
If these tariffs were lowered, that could open up the markets to more trade.
But this is not the only hurdle to overcome, as several other NTMs pose
legitimate threats to the ability to increase trade between the parties and to
finalize and implement the TTIP.30 These NTMs include both sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) measures and the role of geographic indicators.3' In
addition, the proposed inclusion of an investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS) mechanism into the TTIP is subject to much controversy, and could
23. Mark Weisbrot, Stephan Lefebvre, & Joseph Sammut, supra note 17, at 14.
24. Steven Zahniser, NAFTA's Impact On U.S. Agricultural Trade: An Overview, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE EcONomic RESEARCH SERVICE, 10 (July 2002), http:/
/www.ers.usda.gov/media/888749/wrs0201c002.pdf.
25. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,
supra note 10, at 14.
26. Id. at 15.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 22.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 53; see also Michael Scaturro, EU Agriculture Groups Advocate Food Standards,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 11, 2015), http://news.bna.com/tdln/TDLNWB/split-display.adp?
fedfid=75475052&vname=itdbulallissues&wsn=499899000&searchid=26028614&doctypeid=1
&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=TDLNWB&pg=0.
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
WINTER 20161 TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT 499
have pronounced effects on not only the U.S. and EU's agricultural sectors,
but all sectors involved in the trade agreement. 32
II. Barriers to Trade in the TTIP: Non-Tariff Measures
A. SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are cautionary measures taken by
governments to protect humans, animals, and plants from diseases, pests,
contaminants, and things of the like.33 The measures apply to production
procedures for domestic food as well as domestic plant and animal diseases.34
The World Trade Organization (WTO)-of which both the U.S. and the
EU are members-entered into force the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) in 1995 in an effort
to standardize the process through which countries make their rules for food
safety as well as animal and plant health.35 The agreement allows for
countries to set their own health and safety standards, but their standards
must be based on science and necessary to plant and animal health.36
Because the function of SPS measures inherently works to restrict trade, the
SPS Agreement was purposefully designed to prevent the use of SPS
measures for protectionist purposes. 37 Thus, the desired effect of requiring
SPS measures to have a basis in science was to prevent countries from
creating unnecessary barriers to trade while still maintaining a sovereign
government's right to enact measures it deems appropriate to provide for its
populace's safety.38
As it relates to SPS measures, the EU is said to follow the "precautionary
principle," while the U.S. is said to apply a "science-based approach."39 The
EU's position is that, where there is an absence of clear understanding as to
the health-related effects of a certain process or procedure, it is better to
exercise caution than to implement the process or procedure.40 Thus,
companies within the EU have the burden of proving that a certain
technique is safe.4' In contrast, the U.S. requires scientific evidence to prove
that a technique is unsafe. Thus, the U.S. commonly requires that the
32. Elvire Fabry & Giorgio Garbasso, "ISDS" in the TTIP: The Devil is in the Details, NOTRE
EUROPE -JACQUES DELORS INSTITUTE, 1 (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/
ttipisds-fabrygarbasso-nejdi-janl 5.pdf pdf=ok.
33. Understanding the TO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WORLD TRADE






39. TTIP: What is at Stake for EU Agriculture?, supra note 1.
40. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,
supra note 4, at 63.
41. Id.
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government prove that a technique is unsafe in order to prevent a private
company from implementing it.42
The differences in SPS measures between the U.S. and the EU comprise
several of the barriers to trade that must be overcome in the TTIP
negotiations. For instance, while the use and sale of genetically modified
organisms (GMO) is commonplace in the U.S., the EU's approval for the
sale of GMOs is very limited.43 Similarly, the use of growth hormones in
beef, such as recombinant bovine growth hormone (rBST), is the industry
norm in the U.S., while the use of such hormones in animals (as well as the
importation of meat treated with such hormones) is banned in the EU.44
American fears of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, also known as
"mad-cow disease") have also proven to impede agricultural trade, as the
U.S. remains wary of the reliability of EU procedures to test for the
disease.45
1. The Role of GMOs
Genetically modified organisms are organisms whose genetics have been
altered in a non-naturally occurring way, such as by the introduction of
genes from different organisms.46 In terms of food production, the
technique is largely used in order to simultaneously increase yield
production and lower production costs (as a result of increased weed control
and lower labor costs).47 The technique is controversial, however, as it raises
both health and competitive advantage concerns.48
Following the "science-based approach," the U.S argues that the use of
GMOs has been proven safe, and that their exclusion from the EU market is
based on irrational consumer fears.49 The health concerns over the use of
GMOs appear to be rooted in the cultural differences between what
American and European consumers are concerned about in terms of food
safety.so While the main concern of American consumers is bacterial
contamination, European consumers are more concerned with the unknown
effects of GMOs, arguing that U.S. assessments of their effects are
incomplete, misguided, and ignore unsettling concerns such as the increase
in pesticide-resistant "superweeds" that have developed as a result of GMO
use." The differences in public opinion over the proper use of GMOs has
42. Id.
43. Id. at 59.
44. Id. at 59-60.
45. Id. at 51.
46. Food, Genetically modified, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2015), http://www.who.int/
topics/food-geneticallyrmodified/en/.
47. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,
supra note 4, at 59.
48. Id. at 63-64.
49. Id. at 63.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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affected the trade of products containing GMOs from the U.S. to the EU,
but some EU officials argue that European consumers are irrational in their
fear that the TTIP will flood a GMO-free market with tainted products,
because the EU annually imports sixty kilograms of GMO feed per person.52
European consumers may have incorrect notions as to the amount of GMOs
that they already consume, and thus needlessly create barriers to trade as
their EU representatives are forced to cater to their concerns. Despite this,
the European Commission has repeatedly assured its populace that the EU's
high food safety standards will not be weakened by the TTIP and that no
EU state will be forced to import GMOs that have not already been
approved by EU regulators.53
Perhaps a more tangible concern regarding GMOs in the TTIP context is
that EU farmers fear that their inability to use GMOs will put U.S. farmers
at a competitive advantage.54 While the EU's official policy technically
supports the co-production of GMO and ordinary crops, EU farmers face
strict regulations that effectively prevent them from producing GMO crops
unless large areas of uncultivated land surround them.55 As previously
mentioned, a benefit of GMO production is lower production costs. 56 Thus,
if liberalized trade lowered EU tariffs on imported GMO-products from the
U.S., EU farmers-who are effectively restricted from using such
production techniques-would be adversely affected, as local merchants
would opt for the cheaper options.57
Yet another problem surrounding the GMO issue is the EU's insistence
on labeling GMO products it imports from the U.S.ss The U.S. has
historically resisted the labeling of GMO products, both domestically and in
its trade agreements. 59 But the U.S. has recently given ground on the issue
in regards to its exported GMO soybeans.60 In the case of the U.S. soybean
industry, they have indicated that they are more willing to allow for EU
GMO labeling provided that they put labels on soybeans that do not contain
GMOs, rather than labeling soybeans as containing them.61 While
regulatory convergence between the U.S. and the EU has been achieved in
this respect, it appears that convergence is less likely with regard to
52. Michael Scaturro, supra note 31.
53. The EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, supra note 5.
54. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,
supra note 4, at 59.
55. Roxanne Palmer, EU GMO Policy Paradox: Farmers Can't Plant GM Corn, but it can be
Imported, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TINIES (Apr. 25, 2013, 3:40), http://www.ibtimes.com/eu-
gmo-policy-paradox-farmers-cant-plant-gm-corn-it-can-be-imported-1217873.
56. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,
supra note 4, at 59.
57. Id. at 66.
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restrictions being lifted on EU farmers and the appeasement of a GMO-
wary European populace.62
2. The Role of Growth-Hormones and Antibiotics
Currently, the U.S. is allowed to export 46000 tons of hormone and
antibiotic-free beef to the EU.63 But the U.S. has been reluctant in
supplying this type of beef because of high EU tariffs on beef that render the
production unprofitable.64 One of the largest NTMs preventing increased
trade between the U.S. and the EU is the EU's outright ban on hormone-
treated beef. Most U.S. beef production involves the use of injected
hormones, such as rBST, or feed additives, such as ractopamine.65 The EU,
on the other hand, permits neither the use of these procedures by its own
producers nor the importation of any beef subjected to such treatments (the
EU does, however, allow the importation of dairy products that have been
subjected to rBST treatments).66 U.S. beef producers have long lamented
over the regulatory barriers that deny them access to the EU market and
once again condemn the EU regulations as lacking a scientific basis, arguing
that no evidence has been provided that indicates negative impacts on
consumers from the use and consumption of hormone-treated beef.67
Should regulatory convergence occur on this issue in the TTIP
negotiations, resulting in a lifted EU ban on the importation of hormone-
treated beef while still preventing local producers from accessing the market,
EU beef producers fear that this too would provide a competitive cost
advantage for their U.S. counterparts.68 The EU has not waivered on these
bans, however, as concerns for human and animal safety and a fear of a
decline in beef and dairy sales have trumped all other considerations.69 As
meat industry officials from the EU have noted, hormone and antibiotic
growth issues "aren't negotiable at all" and "[t]he expectation by civil society
is too high . . . there's no room at all for changing this position through
TTIP. "70
62. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,
supra note 4, at 64, 66.
63. Michael Scaturro, supra note 31.
64. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,
supra note 4, at 55.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 59-60.
67. Id. at 59.
68. Id. at 60.
69. Id. at 59-60
70. Michael Scaturro, supra note 31.
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3. U.S. Concerns Regarding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
As previously mentioned, bacterial contamination is the primary concern
of U.S. consumers in terms of food safety.71 As a result, fears of BSE-related
risks have curbed the importation of EU beef and developed a barrier to
agricultural trade.72 EU authorities have requested higher importation of
EU beef on the part of the U.S. for a long time, and as a good-faith gesture
in the TTIP negotiations, the U.S. recently allowed the importation of beef
from countries that the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)
determined pose a "negligible" risk of BSE.73 But there are still significant
and costly barriers for the EU countries who have not been given this
"negligible" risk status to overcome if they want to export beef to the U.S.,
as the U.S. requires that it determine that the beef inspection systems of any
country that wants to export beef to the U.S. provides an "equivalent level of
protection" as U.S. inspection systems in terms of human health.74
B. GEOGRAPHIC INDICATORS
The use (or non-use) of geographic indicators is yet another ongoing
NTM sticking point in the TTIP negotiations. Geographic indicators are
used simply to identify a specific product as originating from a specific area
of the world.75 For example, advocates in the EU dairy industry support the
inclusion of geographic indicator provisions in the TTIP that prevent U.S.
production companies from labeling foods as "parmesan" or "feta," as those
cheeses must be produced in their respective regions of Italy and Greece in
order to properly receive those labels.76 Similarly, the Idaho potato industry
favors the inclusion of geographic indicator provisions that would prevent
European potato producers from using their Idaho name brand.77 Even if
provisions are included in the TTIP that protect certain name brands, it still
does not guarantee compliance by the party subject to the restriction.78 For
example, even though past agreements between the U.S. and the EU
contained geographic indicator provisions that protect certain European
wine names, the U.S. has continued to label domestically produced wines
with those European names, contending that the protected wine names are
"semi-generic. "79
71. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU- US Trade Agreement,
supra note 4, at 63.
72. Id. at 51.
73. Id.
74. Id.





78. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,
supra note 4, at 53.
79. Id.
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III. Tariff Barriers to Agricultural Trade in the TTIP
In terms of overall transatlantic trade, tariff barriers have been
significantly reduced over the last several decades.80 However, as hinted at
supra, tariffs on transatlantic agricultural trade remain well above the overall
average. 8' In 2010, the highest average tariffs on agricultural EU exports
were for tobacco (21.8 percent), dairy (20.2 percent), and sugar (18.7
percent).82 The highest average tariffs from the EU on U.S. exports were
much higher than in the U.S., with meat at 45.1 percent, dairy at 42 percent,
and sugar at 24.3 percent.83 Clearly, these high tariffs (particularly those
from the EU) are designed to discourage foreign trade in a particular
commodity and encourage domestic business transactions and the sale of
local goods, which is counter to the aims of the TTIP.84 But while tariffs
remain high in some agricultural sectors, it is important to note the overall
trends. On the U.S. side, tariffs on dairy products fell from 35.1 percent to
20.2 percent from 2004 to 2010, and sugar tariffs fell from 29.1 percent to
18.7 percent.85 In the EU, meat tariffs fell from 58.1 percent to 45.1
percent, and sugar tariffs fell from 29 percent to 24.3 percent.86 These
statistics can be taken as positive signs that, while there may be a long way to
go in terms of tariff barriers in the TTIP negotiations, the barriers are at
least trending in the right direction.
IV. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
The TTIP's inclusion of an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)
mechanism into its provisions is one of the more controversial issues
surrounding the emerging trade deal.87 This mechanism allows private
companies to make direct claims against a state for perceived unfair
treatment by the state's government. The alleged unfair treatment often
takes the form of discrimination (the state offers superior treatment to
national investors or other foreign investors) or prohibitive regulations that
impede the foreign investors' profits and ability to efficiently operate their
business in the country.89 These claims against national governments are
submitted to an arbitral tribunal rather than a national court, as the goal is to
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id. at 22.
82. Id. at 21.
83. Id.
84. Risks and Opportunities for the EU Agri-Food Sector in a Possible EU-US Trade Agreement,
supra note 4, at 11.
85. Id. at 21.
86. Id. at 22.
87. The EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, supra note 5.
88. Padmanabhan, supra note 2.
89. Elvire Fabry & Giorgio Garbasso, supra note 32, at 4.
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provide a neutral, depoliticized form of dispute settlement with a predictable
framework that guarantees the preservation of all concerned parties' rights.90
The inclusion of an ISDS mechanism is less of a trade barrier between the
U.S. and the EU in the TTIP negotiations than it is an issue of heavy
opposition by national populaces.91 Critics claim that these mechanisms
undermine the functions of a democracy and the ability of a sovereign
national government to effectively legislate on behalf of its own citizens.92
For example, if a country implemented laws making it difficult for foreign
tobacco companies to enter their market in an effort to curb the smoking
habits of its populace, those foreign companies could potentially sue the
national government in private arbitration if an FTA had provided for
foreign trade in that industry.93 In terms of how these mechanisms could
affect the EU's agricultural sector as a result of TTIP implementation, the
European populace may harbor fears that U.S. agricultural companies could
sue and prevail against their governments for not allowing the importation
of GMO foods.94 For instance, Monsanto (a U.S. agricultural giant widely
known for their GMO use) could potentially sue an EU nation if the TTIP
provided for liberalized GMO trade between the U.S. and the EU and an
EU nation implemented laws that prohibited the importation of GMO
crops, thereby decreasing Monsanto's profits and their ability to conduct
business in the nation.95
Despite these concerns, statistics show that "the use of ISDS has become
commonplace and is now a reality of the investment world."96 While the
EU has only ratified one treaty that contains an ISDS mechanism (and
entered into two FITAs containing them that have yet to be ratified), the U.S.
has signed ISDS agreements with fifty-seven countries.97 Although critics
claim that ISDS mechanisms undermine democracy, proponents argue that
both investors and state economies benefit from the mechanisms as a result
of their neutrality, swiftness, predictability, and enforceability.98 Regardless,
civil opposition to the TTIP's ISDS provision continues to grow. 99
V. Conclusion
The original December 2015 deadline for the TTIP came and went with
no new binding free trade agreements between the U.S. and the EU. While
negotiations have continued into 2016 (albeit sporadically), the fate of TTIP
90. Id. at 3.
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appears precarious in light of heightened civil and governmental opposition,
as well as the many tariff and non-tariff barriers that continue to prevent an
agreement between the two parties. The EU is worried that an
implemented TTIP will be prejudiced in favor of increased trade while
sacrificing food safety, while the U.S. wants to ensure that it recognizes
overall economic and societal gains from the trade deal.oo In the aftermath
of the British exit from the EU, U.S. lawmakers are trying to gain leverage
over the reticent EU by quickly negotiating and finalizing a bilateral FTA
with the UK.1o U.S. officials see this as a way of pressing the EU to speed
up their TTIP negotiations with the U.S. and finalize the deal before a new
President takes office in 2017.102 If the TTIP is ever finalized and
implemented, it would likely result in increased agricultural and overall trade
between the world's two largest economies.103 The question remains,
however, exactly how increased trade would affect the U.S. and EU
economies, as well as how the affected civil populations would respond to
the trade deal.
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WARE-june20l5.pdf.
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